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Abstract
We present two collective games with new paradoxical features when they are com-
bined. Besides reproducing the so–called Parrondo effect, where a winning game is
obtained from the alternation of two fair games, a new effect appears, i.e., there
exists a current inversion when varying the mixing probability between the games.
We present a detailed study by means of a discrete–time Markov chain analysis,
obtaining analytical expressions for the stationary probabilities for a finite number
of players. We also provide some qualitatively insight into this new current inversion
effect.
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1 Introduction
In the past few years there has been an increasing interest in what is known in
the literature as Parrondo’s paradox [1,2]. This phenomenon shows that the
alternation of two fair (or even losing) games can result in a winning game.
These so-called Parrondo games were originally defined as follows: Game A
is a simple coin tossing game, where the player wins or loses one coin with
probabilities pA and 1 − pA respectively. For game B the winning probabil-
ity depends on the capital of the player modulo three, governed by the set
of probabilities {p1B, p2B, p3B}. In the (stochastic) combination of these games,
either game A or B is played, with probabilities γ and 1− γ respectively. The
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games are said to be fair/losing/winning when on average the player’s capital
stabilizes/decreases/increases.
In the Parrondo games, to which we will further refer as the original game A
and B, the following parameter values were used: pA = 1
2
− ǫ, p1B = 110 − ǫ,
p2B = p
3
B =
3
4
− ǫ. When ǫ = 0 both games A and B played separately are
fair, whereas if ǫ > 0 both games turn out to be losing. The Parrondo effect
appears when the stochastic (0 < γ < 1) or periodic combination of these
fair/losing games results in a winning game.
These games were first devised in 1996 by the Spanish physicist Juan M. R.
Parrondo, who presented them in unpublished form in Torino, Italy [3]. They
served as a pedagogical illustration of the flashing ratchet [4], where directed
motion is obtained from the random or periodic alternation of two relaxation
potentials acting on a Brownian particle, none of which individually produce
any net flux. Only recently a quantitative relation has been established be-
tween the Brownian ratchet and Parrondo’s games [5,6].
Cooperative versions of the games, played by a set of N players, have also
been studied. In [7], a set of N players are arranged in a ring and each round
a player is chosen randomly to play either game A or B. The original game A
is combined with a new game B, for which the winning probability depends
on the state (winner/loser) of the nearest neighbors of the selected player. A
player is said to be a winner (loser) if he has won (lost) his last game. In [8]
again a set of N players is considered, but for this case game A is replaced by
a redistribution process where a player is chosen randomly to give away one
coin of his capital to another player. When combining this new game with the
original game B, the paradox is reproduced.
In this work we present a new version of collective games, where besides ob-
taining the desired result of a winning game out of two fair games, a new
feature appears. The games show under certain circumstances a current in-
version when varying γ, i.e. the value of the mixing probability γ determines
whether you end up with a winning or a losing game A+B. To our knowledge,
this effect is new in the literature on paradoxical games, and in the related
field of Brownian ratchets, as we will discuss in Sec.3.
2 The games
The games will be played by a set of N players. In each round, a player is
selected randomly for playing. Then, with probabilities γ and 1−γ respectively
game A or B is played. Game A is the original game in which the selected
player wins or loses one coin with probability pA and 1− pA respectively. The
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winning probabilities in game B depend on the collective state of all players.
Again, as in [7], a player is said to be a winner or a loser when he has won
or lost respectively his last game. More precisely, the winning probability can
have three possible values, determined by the actual number of winners i
within the total number of players N , in the following way
pBi ≡ probability to win in game B =


p1B if i > ⌈2N3 ⌉,
p2B if ⌈N3 ⌉ ≤ i ≤ ⌈2N3 ⌉,
p3B if i < ⌈N3 ⌉.
(1)
where the brackets ⌈x⌉ denote the nearest integer to the number x.
2.1 Analysis of the games
The main quantity of interest is the average gain of the collection of N players
when playing the stochastic game A+B. Since the winning probability of game
B only depend on the total number of winners, it is sufficient to describe the
games using a set of N + 1 different states {σ0, σ1, . . . , σN}. A state σi is
the configuration where i players are labeled as winner and N − i as loser.
Transitions between the states will be determined by the forward transition
probability pi, the backward transition probability qi, and the probability for
remaining in the same state ri, see Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. Different states and allowed transitions for N players. The arrows indicate
the state of each player being a winner (arrow up) or a loser (arrow down).
Denoting as Pi(t) the probability of finding the system in state σi at the t–th
round played, we can write the equation governing its time evolution as
Pi(t+ 1) = pi−1Pi−1(t) + riPi(t) + qi+1Pi+1(t), (2)
with 0 ≤ i ≤ N and where the transition probabilities are given by
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pi=
N − i
N
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
, (3)
ri=
2i−N
N
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
+
N − i
N
, (4)
qi=
i
N
[
γ (1− pA) + (1− γ) (1− pBi )
]
. (5)
The set of transition probabilities (pi, qi, ri) must satisfy the normalization
condition pi + ri + qi = 1, which implies for the probabilities Pi(t) that∑N
i=0 Pi(t) = 1, as long as
∑N
i=0 Pi(t = 0) = 1.
This system of N+1 equations can be solved in the stationary state, where the
probabilities no longer depend on time Pi(t) = P
st
i , and the general solution
reads
P sti =
1
Z
p0 p1 · · · pi−1 qi+1 qi+2 · · · qN , (6)
where 0 ≤ i ≤ N and Z is the normalization factor. Once the stationary
probabilities are calculated, we can obtain the average winning probability
over all states for the stochastic combination A + B (mixing probability γ)
from
pA+Bwin =
N∑
i=0
[
γ pA + (1− γ) pBi
]
P sti . (7)
The average gain can then easily be evaluated through the expression JA+B =
2pA+Bwin − 1. The properties of the separate games A and B can be obtained by
replacing in the previous expressions γ by 1 or 0 respectively.
2.1.1 The Parrondo effect
The Parrondo effect appears when from the combination of two fair games,
we obtain a winning game. Clearly, game A is fair for pA = 1/2. For game B
the set of values {p1B, p2B, p3B} giving a fair game is more difficult to determine
because it depends on the total number of players N . The conditions on p2B
for a fair game B have been found analytically by a symbolic manipulation
program up to N < 13. In Table 1 we find listed the conditions of fairness for
p2B up to N = 5. When playing only game B (γ = 0), the following symmetry
in the stationary distribution can be deduced from Eq.(6)
P
st,{p1
B
,p2
B
,p3
B
}
i = P
st,{1−p3
B
,1−p2
B
,1−p1
B
}
N−i . (8)
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N p2B
2
p1
B
−1
p1
B
−p3
B
−1
.
3
(p1
B
−1)(p3
B
+1)+
√
(p1
B
−2)(p1
B
−1)p3
B
(p3
B
+1)
(p1
B
+p3
B
−1)
4
(p1
B
−1)2(p3
B
+1)
1+p3
B
+(p1
B
−2)(p1
B
+p1
B
p3
B
−(p3
B
)2)
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[
1− p3B
p1
B
−1
√
5+2p1
B
(p1
B
−3)
1+2p3
B
(1+p3
B
)
]−1
Table 1
Condition on p2B in order that game B is fair for N = 2, . . . , 5.
Figure 2. a) Plot of the current versus the mixing probability γ between games A
and B for N = 4 with probabilities pA = 12 , p
1
B = 0.79, p
2
B = 0.65 and p
3
B = 0.15.
b) Plot of the current versus the mixing probability γ between games A and B for
N = 3 with probabilities pA = 12 , p
1
B = 0.686, p
2
B = 0.423 and p
3
B = 0.8.
This property implies that pA+Bwin is unaffected by the parameter transforma-
tion: {p1B, p2B, p3B} → {1 − p3B, 1 − p2B, 1 − p1B}. It also means that for the
parameter set {p1B, p2B = 1/2, 1− p1B}, the stationary probability distribution
is symmetric over the states, i.e. P sti = P
st
N−i. Therefore, when combining this
with game A, i.e., alternating two games with symmetric probability distri-
butions, always yields a fair game, independent of the values of γ, N and p1B.
To see the Parrondo effect, we need another, non-trivial, parameter set which
yields a fair game B. For example, for N = 4 we obtain a fair game B when
p1B = 0.79, p
2
B = 0.65 and p
3
B = 0.15. The stochastic combination with game
A reproduces the desired Parrondo effect, see Fig. 2.a .
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2.2 Results
2.2.1 Two players
For N = 2 players, there are 3 different states. Fig. 3.a shows the regions in
parameter space {γ, p1B, p3B} where the mixing (0 < γ < 1) between games A
and B results in a fair, winning or losing game. Note that p2B is fixed by the
condition to have a fair game B, see Table 1. Besides the case p1B = 1 − p3B,
valid for any number of players, also p1B = p
3
B results in a fair game for N = 2,
independent of the alternation probability γ. From Eq. (6), one can deduce
that p1B = p
3
B and p
1
B = 1 − p3B imply a symmetric distribution P sti over the
states, i.e. P st0 = P
st
2 . As mentioned before, this property prohibits any net
current in the system. For all other values of p1B and p
3
B the Parrondo effect
appears, that is, game A+B is either a winning or a losing game, cf. Fig. 3.a.
Figure 3. a) N = 2. The regions in parameter space for for which pA+Bwin = 0.5, 0.499
and 0.501, indicating the regions where A+B is fair (blue), losing (red) and winning
(green) respectively. The blue diagonal planes show the situations p1B = 1− p3B and
p1B = p
3
B, for which A + B is fair, independent of γ. b) N = 3. The regions in
parameter space for which the mixing (0 < γ < 1) between game A and B results in
a fair game. Besides the trivial diagonal plane, there is a curved plane – not uniform
in γ – for which JA+B = 0.
2.2.2 Three players
Fig. 3.b shows for N = 3 the surfaces in parameter space {γ, p1B, p3B} where
A+B is a fair game. Besides the plane p1B = 1− p3B, there is a second, curved
surface with values of γ different from 0 and 1 which results in JA+B = 0. This
curved surface is not uniform in γ and is therefore the collection of points of
flux reversal between a winning and losing game A + B. This implies that,
depending on the value of γ we can either have a winning game or a losing
game by alternating between two fair games. For example, in Fig. 2.b we have
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plotted the current JA+B vs. γ for the set of probabilities pA = 1
2
, p1B = 0.686,
p2B = 0.423 and p
3
B = 0.8. For low values of γ the resulting game is a losing
game, whereas for high values of γ the game turns to be a winning game, cf.
Fig 2.b. In both regions there exists an optimal value for γ giving a maximum
current. We can provide a qualitative picture that may help understanding
the mechanism by which the current inversion phenomenon takes place.
When playing exclusively game B (γ = 0), the stationary distribution P sti is
not homogeneous. This is reflected by the fact that the central states {σ1, σ2}
have a higher occupancy probability (P sti ) than the boundary states {σ0, σ3}.
On the other hand, if we look to the winning probability, it is higher in the
latter set of states rather than in the former one (p1B, p
3
B > p
2
B).
Indeed, the central states can be labelled as losing states, as when combining
game B with game A for any 0 ≤ γ < 1, the average losing probability
pli = γ(1 − pA) + (1 − γ)(1 − pBi ) < 12 , i.e., it is more likely on average for a
player to lose money rather than to win when being in one of these states. On
the other hand, for the boundary states the contrary is true: it is more likely
to win money rather than to lose for any 0 ≤ γ < 1, so we can refer to them
as winning sites, i.e., pwi = γp
A + (1− γ)pBi > 12 .
When combining game B with A, the resulting game will be fair, losing or
winning depending on the net balance between the occupancy probabilities
and the average winning probability on each set of central and boundary states.
For low γ values (playing game B more often), the high occupancy probability
of {σ1, σ2} is the dominant part, and due to the low winning probability on
these sites the resulting game is a losing game. On the contrary, for higher γ
values (playing game A more often), the winning probability on the boundary
sites {σ0, σ3} is high enough to compensate their low occupancy, resulting in
a winning game.
2.2.3 N players
For a general number of players, we have not been able to find the analytical
expressions for a fair game B. Nevertheless, we will show numerically that
the results for N = 3 are representative for any N . This is illustrated by
Fig. 4, where the parameter space {p2B, p3B} giving a fair game B is shown,
corresponding to a fixed p1B = 0.4 and different values of N . As shown, the
different curves seem to converge to a limiting curve as N increases. Note that
all curves intersect at the trivial point {p1B = 0.4, p2B = 0.5, p3B = 0.6}.
We can also obtain the parameter space where the current inversion takes
place, for different values of N . For clarity reasons we show in Fig. 5 only
a vertical slice corresponding to a fixed γ = 0.4, and different values of N .
Again, the regions for which a flux inversion exists, doesn’t seem to depend
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Figure 4. Plot of the parameter space {p2B , p3B} for a fixed p1B = 0.4 that gives a
fair game B for different values of N = 3, 10, 30, 50, 100, 200 and 300. As it can be
seen, the curves seem to converge to a limiting curve as N increases.
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Figure 5. Plot of the points in parameter space {p1B , p3B} where (for γ = 0.4 fixed)
A + B is a fair game. Results for different values of the total number of players
N = 3, 4, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 are shown. The diagonal line shows the common
plane p1B = 1− p3B, that corresponds to a fair game B for any number of players N .
much on N . The only exception is N = 4, for which the curve bends in the
other direction. This is a consequence of the fact that for N = 4 there exists
only one state (namely σ2) where the probability p
2
B is used. This is confirmed
by our findings when we modify the definition of game B such that there
is for any N only one state where p2B is used. The fact that all curves of
inversion points are symmetric upon reflection about the plane p1B = 1 − p3B
is a consequence of the property of Eq. (8).
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3 Parrondo’s games and the current inversion
As stated previously, in the original Parrondo games the effect of a current
inversion when varying the mixing probability γ is not possible. One way of
understanding the reason is by means of the relation that has been estab-
lished recently [5,6,9] between the Brownian ratchet and Parrondo’s games. A
fair or unfair paradoxical game corresponds to a periodic or tilted potential
respectively in the model of a Brownian ratchet.
Figure 6. a) Plot of the potential related to the original Parrondo game B ob-
tained with the relation described in [5]. b) Effective potential that we obtain when
alternating between the original Parrondo games A and B with probability γ = 12 .
As an illustration, we have depicted the potential corresponding to the original
game B in Fig. 6.a. If we now combine game B with A –which would have an
associated flat potential– with a certain probability γ, the potential obtained is
no longer periodic, i.e., it is tilted to the right in agreement with the direction
of the flux, see Fig. 6.b. Therefore, the question now reduces to explain why
there is no current inversion in the flashing ratchet model when varying the
rate of alternation between the potentials.
ON
ON
OFF
a)
b)
c)
Figure 7. Different stages of the mechanism of rectification when switching a ratchet
potential on and off.
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In the flashing ratchet model, the appearance of a flux when alternating be-
tween a flat and an asymmetric potential is due to a rectification process: if we
consider a bunch of Brownian particles subjected to a ratchet potential, they
will tend to remain in the potential well for a sufficiently small temperature
–see Fig. 7.a . When the potential is switched off the particles start diffusing,
and if we wait for long enough, it is more likely that a small fraction of par-
ticles will reach the vicinity of the potential well located to the right, rather
than the one on the left, due to the geometry of the potential. Switching on
and off the potential many times, generates a net flux to the right. Whence,
whatever the rate of alternation between these two potentials, it will always
be more likely for a particle to move rightwards rather leftwards. Therefore it
will be impossible to obtain a current reversal by means of varying only the
flip rate of the potentials.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a new type of collective Parrondo games. These games
present, besides the Parrondo effect, a current inversion when varying the
alternation probability γ between the two games A and B. This phenomenon
is new in the literature on paradoxical games and the related ratchet models.
Analytical expressions for the games have been obtained for a finite number of
players using discrete–time Markov chain techniques. We have also explained
qualitatively the reason of this current inversion.
It remains as an open question the possible implications of these findings in
the field of the Brownian ratchet, as well as the possibility of finding a physical
model equivalent to this collective game.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank C. Van den Broeck for very helpful
discussions. PA and RT acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de
Educacio´n y Ciencia (Spain), FEDER projects FIS2004-5073, FIS2004-953.
PA is supported from the local governement of the Balearic Islands.
References
[1] G. P. Harmer, D. Abbott, Losing strategies can win by Parrondo’s paradox,
Nature 402 (1999) 864.
[2] G. P. Harmer, D. Abbott, A review of Parrondo’s paradox, Fluctuation and Noise
Letters 2 (2002) R71–R107.
10
[3] J. M. R. Parrondo, How to cheat a bad mathematician, EEC HC&M Network
on Complexity and Chaos(#ERBCHRX-CT 940 546), Torino, Italy (1996).
Unpublished.
[4] P. Reimann, Brownian motors: noisy transport far from equilibrium, Physics
Reports 361 (2002) 57–265.
[5] R. Toral, P. Amengual, S. Mangioni, Parrondo’s games as a discrete ratchet,
Physica A 327 (2003) 105–110.
[6] R. Toral, P. Amengual, S. Mangioni, A Fokker-Planck description for Parrondo’s
games, Proc. SPIE Noise in complex systems and stochastic dynamics 5114
(2003) 309–317.
[7] R. Toral, Cooperative Parrondo’s games, Fluctuations and Noise Letters 1 (2001)
L7–L12.
[8] R. Toral, Capital redistribution brings wealth by Parrondo’s paradox,
Fluctuations and Noise Letters 2 (2002) L305–L311.
[9] P. Amengual, R. Toral, Exact ratchet description of Parrondo’s games with self–
transitions, Noise in Complex Systems and Stochastic Dynamics II. Proc. of
SPIE 5471 (2004) 407–415.
11
